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1.  Introduction  
 
Economists tend to identify the causes of development on the grounds of resource 
endowment and technology. In essence, modern growth theory responds to this notion. 
Unlike this vision, a new perspective, not necessarily incompatible, has emerged in last 
decades. This perspective insists on the relevancy that normative framework and 
institutions have on fostering development. The institutional structure defines incentives 
and penalties, shapes social behaviour and articulates collective action, thus 
conditioning development. In last years, a myriad of empirical studies has supported 
this relationship between institutional quality and development; and, though less 
conclusively, the one between institutional quality and growth (Aron, 2000). The 
positive impact of institutional quality on development has been pointed out by crossed 
section analyses (Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2002; Rodrik et al., 2002; or 
Easterly and Levine) as well as case studies (for example, Rodrik, 2003). 
 
However, from an economic policy viewpoint it is not sufficient to acknowledge that 
institutions do matter. It is also necessary to identify the determinants of institutional 
quality. This is a crucial task in order to implement policies aimed at building better 
institutions. Nevertheless, empirical research is scarcer in this area and its conclusions 
are less tenable. This is partly due to the difficulties faced by empirical work. More 
precisely, it faces i) deficient institutional quality indicators; ii) problems stemming 
from endogenous variables; iii) collinearity among the potentially explanatory variables 
preventing them from being considered independent factors; and iv) the possible 
presence of omitted variables that can bias the parameters estimated. 
 
The simplifying conception that economists have been assuming on institutions in their 
modelling also hinders empirical research. Institutions are often considered to be 
efficient responses to transaction costs. It is supposed that agents operate exclusively 
driven by rational optimization criteria, that social dynamics get rid of inefficient 
institutions and that the existing ones improve social welfare. As a consequence, there is 
no problem whatsoever in defining "ideal institutions" - the ones of the successful 
countries - and in transplanting them to other nations. These premises have inspired a 




Nevertheless, the failures shown by these institutional "transplant" policies indicate that 
institutions do not work if they are not capable of shaping agents behaviour in an 
effective manner. This proposition underlines the relevance of legitimacy (or 
credibility) of institutions and their highly specific nature regarding the particular 
context in which they operate. Therefore, the fact that an institution prevails does not 
mean that it promotes socially efficient behaviours. Institutions are also structures of 
power that articulate and reflect hierarchical relations. Far from being always efficient 
social options, institutions are often interest-driven creations used by those who have 
the power to establish rules (North, 1993). 
 
In spite of these difficulties, some studies have identified variables determining 
institutional quality. Some of these determinants are out of the reach of economic 
policy, such as country geographical location, colonial origin, legal system tradition, 
ethno-linguistic fragmentation or natural resources endowment. Yet, these variables 
often lose significance when they are controlled for level of development. Some other 
studies have explained institutional quality in terms of determinants more directly 
related to economic and social options, such as income distribution, international 
openness or education. 
 
This paper provides new evidences about the determinants of institutional quality. Prior 
to implementing our empirical research, we discuss the criteria that should be used to 
judge the quality of institutions. Then, we identify the factors that, according to these 
criteria, determine institutional quality. The results obtained in the estimated model 
enable to draw some interesting conclusions. First of all, as it was expected, 
development level determines institutional quality: the highest the former, the highest 
the latter. Secondly, income distribution seems to condition institutional quality. A 
certain degree of social cohesion is needed to provide institutional predictability and 
legitimacy. Thirdly, a sound tax system is positively associated with institutional quality 
improvement. Taxes provide the necessary revenue to generate quality institutions, 
while creating a narrower and more demanding relation between State and citizens. 
Finally, education improves institutional quality. It determines the innovation capacity 
and the dynamic efficiency of institutions. On the contrary, some of the variables 
identified in the literature either they do not seem to determine institutional quality or 
their effects are indirect, through the aforementioned variables.  
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The remainder of paper is organized as follows. In section two, institutional quality 
criteria are discussed. Section three identifies the variables that are supposed to explain 
institutional quality. In section four we develop our empirical analysis for a wide 
sample of countries, identifying the determinants of institutional quality. In section five 
each determinant contribution is computed. Section six tests the results found by using 
alternative institutional quality indicators, confirming that they are acceptably robust 
relationships. Finally, the main conclusions are considered in last section. 
 
2.  Criteria of institutional quality 
 
In last two decades, a myriad of studies have explored the role of institutions in 
development. To make this possible, a considerable number of institutional quality 
indicators have been elaborated by multilateral organisations, risk-rating agencies, 
academic institutions and non-governmental organizations. Given the extent of the 
available repertoire, it is not surprising that their characteristics and quality levels 
greatly differ among indicators. Nevertheless, most of them lack a theoretical 
framework linking the indicator to previously defined institutional quality criteria. What 
does it define the quality of an institution? To respond to this question, we must 
consider the functions an institution fulfils. 
 
As Greif (2006) argued, institutions might be defined as a set of social factors, rules, 
beliefs, values and organizations that jointly motivate regularity in individual and social 
behaviour. Thus, institutions can be seen as an inter-temporary contract that shapes 
behaviours; or seeking out another simile (Aoki, 2000) as a system of shared beliefs 
about the equilibrium of a game played repeatedly. Therefore, good institutions will be 
those that stimulate agents’ activities with a high social return. Thus, they will draw 
together private and social returns, assuring a more efficient collective effort allocation. 
On the other hand, deficient institutions are those that stimulate socially useless or 
unproductive behaviours. 
 
Since institutions do not really work if they are not capable of shaping behaviours, in 
order to evaluate them, it is important to analyze not only the rules that institutions 
define, but also the individuals’ motivations to fulfil them. Therefore, so relevant it is to  
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study the incentives framework in which the agents operate as why they behave 
according to them. It is necessary to know why some rules are observed while some 
others are not. Hence, the legitimacy of institutions becomes a basic feature 
conditioning its efficiency. 
 
Institutions respond to problems that social interaction rises up in an uncertain world. In 
this context, institutions constitute a mechanism to reduce discretional behaviours and 
to limit opportunism. In addition, since they shape social behaviours, institutions foster 
social interaction and collective action, reducing coordination costs. Yet, it would be 
mistaken to suppose that institutions always endure a rational response to social 
transaction costs. They are also a mechanism through which social actors express their 
strategies. Hence, a society does not have necessarily all institutions it needs nor are the 
existing ones necessarily optimal.   
 
According to this approach, institutions have two economic basic functions: on the one 
hand, reducing transaction costs, granting certainty and predictability to social 
interaction; on the other hand, easing economic agents’ coordination. If these functions 
are kept in mind, institutional quality must be defined by four basic criteria. 
 
· Static efficiency: the institution capacity to be incentive-compatible. In other words, it 
is the capacity to promote behaviours that reduce social costs. 
 
· Credibility (or legitimacy): the institution capacity to define inter-temporary credible 
contracts. That is to say, it is the institution’s ability to generate a normative framework 
that truly determines agents’ conduct. 
 
·  Security (or predictability): an institution fulfils its function if it reduces the 
uncertainty associated with human interaction. In fact, one of the institutional functions 
is to grant a higher level of safety and stability to social relations by diminishing 
transaction costs. 
 
· Adaptability (or dynamic efficiency): This is to say, institutional ability to be able to 
anticipate social changes or at least to generate the incentives that facilitate agents’ 
adjustment to these changes.  
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These criteria can inspire analytical exploration and empirical work seeking out 
variables that determine institutional quality. In the following sections, a model will be 
constructed and estimated by incorporating variables related to the four criteria 
previously defined. 
 
3.  Determinants of institutional quality 
 
As mentioned, the study of institutions faces the limited reliability of the available 
institutional quality indicators (Arndt and Oman, 2006). Broadly speaking, institutional 
quality indicators show five main shortcomings. First, most of them are based on 
subjective opinions from firm managers, international bureaucrats or scholars; and the 
sample is not always representative. Second, indicators often contain value judgements 
that are not made explicit. For example, institutional quality is frequently linked to 
market flexibility, thus leaving apart risk aversion as a potential social value. Third, 
institutional quality indicators do not always distinguish between institutions and 
policies. Four, in the case of composite indicators, the aggregation method is not always 
well conducted. Finally, the quality of the data used to build the indicators is unlikely to 
be homogenous across countries. 
 
As a result of theses shortcomings, the available indicators only capture imperfectly the 
true quality of institutions, which compels us to be cautious in the interpretation of the 
results stemming from empirical research. The World Bank Governance Indicators 
average (GIs) may be the best available proxy for institutional quality, not only for 
greater accuracy but also for the wider geographical coverage
1. The results obtained in 
using the composite index as the dependent variable are tested against employing 
separately the six components of the GIs and alternative indicators. 
 
As far as the explanatory variables are concerned, these were selected on the basis of 
their relation to those institutional quality criteria previously defined: static efficiency, 
dynamic efficiency, predictability and legitimacy. According to these criteria, 
                                                 
1  See Kaufman et al. (2006) for a methodological description of the Governance Indicators. For a 




development level is identified, as one of the first clearer explanatory variables, which 
operates on institutional quality through both supply and demand. Firstly, it determines 
the availability of resources to build good institutions. Secondly, it generates a larger 
demand for quality institutions. It is a determinant related to the static efficiency of 
institutions. In addition, the positive relationship between both variables has been 
confirmed by previous research (Chong and Zanforlinm 2000, Islam and Montenegro, 
2002, or Rigobon and Rodrik, 2004, among others). 
 
Income distribution is the second variable considered. It allegedly affects both 
institutional predictability and legitimacy. Firstly, because a strong inequality causes 
divergent interests among different social groups, which, in turn, leads to conflicts, 
socio-political instability and insecurity. Secondly, inequality facilitates that institutions 
remain captured by groups of power, whose actions are orientated to particular interests 
rather than to the common good. Thirdly, it diminishes social agents’ disposition to 
cooperative action and favours corruption and rent-seeking activities. Also this 
relationship is supported by previous studies (Alesina and Rodrik, 1993; Alesina and 
Perotti, 1996; or Easterly, 2001); though in some cases the results depend on the 
inclusion of regional dummies (for example, in Islam and Montenegro, 2002, the 
relationship disappears once Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa regional dummies 
are incorporated in the model estimated). In addition, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 
2002, 2005 and 2006) argue that a very unequal income distribution encourage 
institutions that, in turn, tend to perpetuate inequality, thus generating a vicious circle 
between inequality and low institutional quality. 
 
International openness is the third factor that can encourage institutional quality. It is 
related to the dynamic efficiency of institutions. Firstly, it creates a more dynamic, 
sophisticated and demanding environment, which fuels a larger demand for good 
institutions. Secondly, international openness encourages a more competitive 
environment; therefore it can hinder rent-seeking activities, corruption and nepotism. 
Finally, openness can facilitate learning processes and good practices imitation from 
other countries experience. References to this variable are abundant, though with not 
totally coincidental results. For example, Rodrik et al. (2002) confirm that openness has 
a positive impact on institutional quality, but their estimates do not control for 
development level. Rigobon and Rodrik (2004) find a positive relationship, though  
 
7
weak, between trade openness and the rule of law, but the relationship becomes 
negative in case of democracy. The authors interpret this paradoxical result in terms of 
distributive tensions generated by economic openness. Also Islam and Montenegro 
(2002) state that, when controlling for development level, openness affects some 
institutional quality variables but not others. Finally, the work of Knack and Azfar 
(2000), referred to corruption, shows that the results are very sensitive to the country 
sample used. 
 
Education is the fourth factor considered as a determinant of institutional quality. It is a 
variable related to institutions dynamic efficiency. A more educated population 
demands more transparent and dynamic institutions and permits to build them. This is a 
variable seldom considered in empirical research. As an exception, the work of Alesina 
and Perotti (1996), which confirms the positive impact of education on institutional 
quality, must be pointed out. Also, in the literature on corruption, the education effect 
has been detected in works as those of Glaeser and Sacks (2006) or Evans and Rauch 
(2000). 
 
Finally, the fifth determinant of institutional quality has not been, to our knowledge, 
taken into account by previous studies. Yet, it is a crucial variable that affects both the 
static efficiency and the legitimacy of institutions: taxes. A sound tax system not only 
provides the necessary resources to build high quality institutions, but also enables the 
consolidation of a social contract that gives rise to a more demanding relationship 
between state and citizens. As a result, there will be higher transparency and 
accountability, which leads to better institutional quality (Tilly, 1992; Moore, 2002). 
This may not happen with public revenues collected from other sources such as state-
owned companies or natural resources. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned variables, we have also taken into account some other 
determinants traditionally considered in the literature related to countries’ “historical” 
features. In particular, several authors have noted that ethno-linguistic fragmentation 
can influence negatively on institutional quality. Greater heterogeneity may fuel 
tensions and conflicts between different groups, reduce social cooperation and generate 
a mismatch between formal and informal institutions. Easterly and Levine (1997), 
Alesina et al. (2003) or Easterly et al. (2006) found evidence supporting this hypothesis.  
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However, when controlling for development level, this relationship largely lost its 
significance, as revealed by Alesina et al. (2003) or Islam and Montenegro (2002). 
 
A country's legal system origin is another element that has been identified as a potential 
determinant of institutional quality. It is argued that the British origin system and to a 
lesser extent German or Scandinavian systems, is based on a greater recognition of 
economic freedom, which limits the state intervention in the economy. On the contrary, 
the French origin legal system and even more the Soviet system were designed to 
determine the state's ability to organize economic and social life, leading to a weaker 
recognition of property rights and individual freedom. Accordingly, British and Nordic 
legal traditions are expected to be associated with higher institutional quality. Authors 
such as La Porta et al. (1999), Glaeser and Shleifer (2002), Chong and Zanforlin (2000) 
or Easterly and Levine (2003) find empirical support for this hypothesis. In the latter 
case, however, they do not control for development level. 
 
Some authors suggest that for former colonies, the ways of colonization may have been 
influenced their institutional quality. While the arguments provided are not always 
consistent, it is assumed that UK colonization has been less noxious than others, since it 
has favoured the emergence of an institutionalism better prepared to undertake a market 
economy. This approach precludes that fact that even a single metropolis could have 
pursued different models of dominance in its various colonies, for example, the UK in 
the United States, India or Nigeria. It is, however, a controversial relationship, 
confirmed by some authors (Acemoglu et al., 2001; or, in case of corruption, Treisman, 
2000) but denied by others (Alonso, 2007). 
 
Institutional quality can also be influenced by geographical conditions. It is considered 
that a country location in the tropics, lack of access to the sea, or soil fertility may have 
influenced the development of strong quality institutions. This argument is supported by 
Gallup et al. (1998) or Easterly and Levine (2003), among others.  
 
Finally, valuable natural resources can also affect institutional quality. They can 
negatively affect institutions by fostering rent seeking activities and replacing tax 
revenues by other revenue sources less transparent and less subject to accountability.  
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Sachs and Warner (1997) and Easterly and Levine (2003) confirmed this relationship, 
although in the latter case they did not control for development level. 
 
4.  The Model 
4.1.  Endogeneity  
 
Some of the determinants previously outlined are clearly exogenous, while others are 
potentially endogenous. In that case, instrumental variables methodology must be used. 
It should be noted that the analysis that follows is not designed to provide a full 
analytical explanation of the different variables, but only to test if they are endogenous 
and if so, to identify the potential instruments to be used
2.  
 
Thus, per capita income was estimated by applying a traditional convergence equation 
where the dependent variable is 2004 per capita GDP. The explanatory variables are its 
lagged value in 1990 and institutional quality, controlling further for potential regional 
specificities (Table 1). As shown, institutional quality was found to be positive and 
significant, indicating that per capita income should be treated as an endogenous 
variable. As instruments for it, we decided to use its lagged value in 1990 and the East 
Asia dummy, which also turned out to be significant (at 90% probability). 
 
Table 1. Determinants of per capita income  
Variable Value  t-ratio 
Constant 1,33  4.49 
Per capita GDP (1990)  0,86  24.48 
Institutional Quality (GIs average 2006)  0,26  4.48 
East Asia  0.21  2.18 
Instrumental Variables. Endogenous: GIs average 2006. Instrument: GIs average 1998 
Adjusted R
2: 0.91. Observations: 160. Robust Estimate  
 
 
Income distribution is also a potentially endogenous variable. The higher the 
institutional quality, the more equitable income distribution is. To study this possibility, 
we estimated an equation where the Gini index was made dependent on per capita GDP, 
its square value, institutional quality, ethnic fragmentation and regional dummies (Table 
                                                 
2 See Appendix I for a description of the variables used in this paper.  
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2). A nonlinear relationship between income distribution and per capita income was 
found. Middle-income countries have more unequal distributions than low and high 
income countries, thus corroborating the Kuznets hypothesis. It was also found that the 
greater ethnic fragmentation, the most unequal income distribution is. In addition, three 
regional dummies were significant: Europe and Central Asia (negative) and Sub-
Saharan Africa and Latin America (positive). 
 
With respect to institutional quality, while the corresponding parameter shows the 
expected sign, it is not significant. Since this result may mask the existence of 
collinearity between institutional quality and per capita income, we estimated the same 
equation but dropping this last variable (column b, Table 2). The results show that 
institutional quality is significant. Given this result, we decided to consider income 
distribution as an endogenous variable, selecting as instruments per capita income, its 
square value in 1990, ethnic fragmentation and three regional dummies. 
 
Table 2. Determinants of Gini Index 
 (a)  (b) 
Variable  Value t-ratio Value t-ratio 
Constant -1,90  1.51  3.6  147.28 
Per capita GDP   1,26  4,22     
(Per capita GDP)
2 -0,07  3,99     
Institutional Quality   -0.05  0,93  -0.04  2.16 
Ethnic  Fragmentation    0,01 2,62 0.01 1.99 
Europe & Central Asia   -0,16  3,94  -0.15  3.43 
Latin  America    0,28 7,00 0.35 9.85 
Sub-Saharan  Africa    0,34 5,74 0.21 4.09 
Adjusted R
2   0,60  0.54 
Nº Observations  121  126 
Endogenous Institutional  Quality  2006, 
per capita GDP 2004, (per 
capita GDP 2004)
2 
Institutional Quality 2006 
Instruments Institutional  Quality  1998, 
per capita GDP 1990, (Per 
capita GDP 1990)
2 
Institutional Quality 1998 
(a) Per capita GDP is included. (b) Per capita GDP is excluded.  
Instrumental Variables. Robust Estimates  
Tax revenue is another variable that can be potentially endogenous, for institutional 
quality may influence the underlying fiscal contract. To investigate this possibility, it 
was considered that tax revenue depends on per capita income, available natural 
resources and institutional quality. Firstly, a higher level of development increases both  
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the demand for public expenditure and the capacity to pay taxes. Secondly, the 
existence of valuable natural resources represents an alternative source of public 
revenue, thus decreasing taxes. Finally, better institutions can increase tax revenue 
because they lead to a better tax system design and improve tax administration 
capabilities. According to our estimates, per capita income and institutional quality, 
though showing the expected sign, are not significant when both variables are 
introduced simultaneously into the equation (Table 3, column a). However, they are 
individually significant when the other is removed from the equation (columns b and c). 
Since this suggests collinearity problems, we decided to consider taxes as an 
endogenous variable. As instruments for tax revenue, fuel exports and two regional 
dummies, Latin America and South Asia, were selected. 
 
 
Table 3. Determinants of tax revenue 
 (a)  (b)  (c) 
Variable  Value t-ratio Value t-ratio Value  t-ratio 
Constant  2,10  1.92  2.99 70.53 0.63 1.69 
Per capita GDP   0.10  0.80      0.27  6.48 
Institutional  Quality  0.24 1.62 0.34 8.79     
Fuel  -0,02 1.55 -0.01 1.02 -0.03  1.71 
Latin  America  -0,16 1,72 -0.14 1.82 -0.22  2.92 
South  Asia    -0,49 3,45 -0.45 3.80 -0.55  3.66 
Adjusted R
2   0,37  0.38  0.32 
Nº Observations  120  124  120 
Endogenous 
Institutional Quality 












per capita GDP 
1990 
(a) Per capita GDP is included. (b) Per capita GDP is excluded. (c) Institutional Quality 
is excluded.  
Instrumental Variables. Robust Estimates  
 
 
Also international openness may be an endogenous variable associated with institutional 
quality. As its determinants, we considered per capita GDP, with a positive expected 
sign, population (negative) and institutional quality. According to the results, the 
corresponding parameters of per capita income and institutional quality, though 
showing the expected sign, were not significant (Table 4, column a). Since this may be 
due to collinearity, the same equation was estimated by dropping one of these two  
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variables (columns b and c). In this case, both were significant and showed the expected 
signs. Therefore, openness rate was considered as an endogenous variable, selecting as 
instruments population and regional dummies for East Asia and Europe and Central 
Asia. 
 
Table 4. Determinants of openness rate 
 (a)  (b)  (c) 
Variable  Value t-ratio Value t-ratio Value t-ratio 
Constant  6,08 11.81 6.58 21.71 5.94  8.60 
Per capita GDP   0.07  1.28      0.08  2.50 
Institutional  quality   0.03 0.33 0.14 2.82     
Population  -0,16 8,61 -0.15 7.70 -0.15 8.60 
Eur.  &  Central  Asia    0,28 3,62 0.28 4.03 0.28 3.78 
East  Asia    0,34 2,59 0.08 0.36 0.34 2.67 
Adjusted R
2    0,45 0.36 0.43 
Nº  Observations  158 178 159 
Endogenous 
Institutional 
Quality 2006, per 
capita GDP 2004 
Institutional 
Quality 2006 




Quality 1998, per 
capita GDP 1990 
Institutional 
Quality 1998 
per capita GDP 
1990 
(a) Per capita GDP is included. (b) Per capita GDP is excluded. (c) Institutional 
Quality is excluded.  
Instrumental Variables. Robust Estimates 
 
 
Education could also be an endogenous variable associated with institutional quality. 
Replicating previous procedures, it was considered to be dependant on per capita 
income and institutional quality. According to our estimates, while the former showed 
the expected sign and it was significant, the latter was not, and  it showed a “negative” 
sign (table 5, column a). However, faced with possible collinearity problems, the 
equation was re-estimated by eliminating per capita income. In this case, institutional 
quality was significant and showed a positive sign. Given this ambiguity, we decided to 
investigate the determinants of institutional quality considering education both as an 




Table 5. Determinants of education 
 (a)  (b) 
Variable  Value t-ratio Value t-ratio 
Constant -2,94  3.81  1.65  38.26 
Per capita GDP   0,53  6.06     
Institutional Quality   -0.15  1,55  0.45  11.51 
Adjusted R
2   0,71  0.47 
Nº Observations  105  122 
Endogenous Institutional  Quality  2006, 
per capita GDP 2004 
Institutional Quality 2006 
Instruments Institutional  Quality  1998, 
per capita GDP 1990 
Institutional Quality 1998 
((a) Per capita GDP is included. (b) Per capita GDP is excluded. 
Instrumental Variables. Robust Estimates 
 
 
The rest of the variables taken into account, ethnic fragmentation, legal system, colonial 
origin, geographical location or natural resources were considered exogenous.    
 
4.2   The estimated model. Results 
 
The econometric analysis of institutional quality faces the problem stemming from an 
extensive list of potential explanatory factors and possible colinearity among some of 
them. Therefore, the variables were separated into two groups. On the one hand, those 
variables responding to "historical" features of countries, which are hardly malleable by 
government action. On the other hand, those variables directly related to the previously 
defined quality institutional criteria: efficiency (static and dynamic), predictability and 
legitimacy. Regarding the first group, the estimated equation would be as follows: 
 
Di NR GL CO LS EF Y IQ 6 5 4 3 2 1 + β + β + β + β + β + β + α = , (1) 
 
where, for each country, IQ stands for institutional quality; Y for development level; EF 
represents ethnic fragmentation; LS is the legal system tradition; CO stands for colonial 
origin; GL is geographic location; NR is natural resource endowment; and Di represents 
regional dummies. As previously indicated, we used the World Bank Governance 
Indicators average as a proxy for institutional quality. Development level was defined as 
(log) PPP per capita income; ethnic fragmentation has been approached by an indicator 
constructed by Alesina et al. (2003); legal system origin, through dummies; colonial  
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origin is taken from Laporta et al. (1999); geographic location is measured by countries 
distance to the tropics, and natural resources by the share of fuel in total exports. 
 
Contrary to other studies, ethnic fragmentation, legal system origin and natural resource 
endowments were found not to be significant (Table 6). Although, this can partly be due 
to differences in the indicators and sample employed, it should be pointed out that the 
existing empirical evidence regarding these variables is not too conclusive. Parameters 
use to lose significance when estimations are controlled for per capita income. 
Secondly, colonial origin is only significant (at 90%) for former Spanish colonies. 
However, this result can cover up Latin America peculiarity concerning income 
distribution, which is a variable that crucially affects institutional quality, as it shall be 
seen later. Thirdly, a country's geographical location is the only factor within the so-
called "historical” ones that is significant. Finally, Middle East and North Africa and 





Table 6. Determinants of institutional quality (I) 
Variable Value  t-  ratio 
Constant -4.58  9.43 
per capita GDP   0.50  7.82 
Ethnic fragmentation   0.01  1.12 
Former British colonies   0.18  1.63 
Former Spanish colonies  -0.22  1.65 
Former French colonies   0.05  0.33 
British legal system   -0.09  0.86 
Geographic Location  1.43  3.52 
Fuel -0.11  0.64 
Middle East & North. Afr.  -0.71  4.00 
Europe & Central Asia   -0.59  4.35 
Adjusted R
2   0.77 
Nº Observations   127 
Endogenous: Per capita GDP 2004. Instruments: pc GDP 1990 
Instrumental Variables. Robust Estimates. Exactly Identified Equation  
 
 
                                                 
3 It was tested to separate this region into Europe, on the one hand and Central Asia, on the other. Both 
dummies were negative and significant, albeit the latter showed a slightly higher absolute value. It also 
must be noted that for clear outliers were identified: Zimbawe and Algeria (a lower institutional quality 
than estimated) and Bostwana and Chile (higher). Yet, results do not change if these countries are 
removed from the sample.   
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The second estimated model directly responds to determinants related to the previously 
defined institutional quality criteria. In particular, the estimated equation is: 
 
Di OR Ed T G Y IQ 5 4 3 2 1 + β + β + β + β + β + α =  (2) 
 
where IQ stands for institutional quality; Y for development level; G is income 
distribution, measured by the Gini index; T represents tax revenues as a percentage of 
GDP; Ed is education; OR is openness rate; and Di are regional dummies. All 
explanatory variables, except for dummies, were transformed into logs to soften 
potential collinearity problems. The equation was estimated by instrumental variables, 
using as proxies those detailed in the previous section. Regarding education, it was 
considered both an exogenous and an endogenous variable. 
 
In the first case, the most relevant results are as follows (table 7, column a). Firstly, the 
equation estimated shows a relatively high R
2 (0.80), which implies that the variables 
chosen explain a large proportion of institutional quality differences across countries. 
Secondly, under and over-identification tests indicate that the instruments used are 
appropriate. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic is above the critical value of the 
corresponding χ2, while the J statistic falls under it. Thirdly, all variables show the 
expected sign and are significant, except openness rate. Finally, Middle East and North 
Africa and Europe and Central Asia were again the only regions to show institutional 
peculiarities (negative). Therefore, the results suggest that a higher development level 
leads to higher institutional quality. As the latter also promotes economic development, 
this implies that these two variables interact and may lead to vicious or virtuous circles 
of institutional quality and growth. 
 
The Gini index significance implies that a more equitable income distribution improves 
a country institutional quality. Reversely, a context of high social inequality leads to bad 
institutions. As indicated above, Islam and Montenegro (2002) considered that the Gini 
index significance disappears after introducing dummies for Latin America and Sub-
Saharan Africa. Our results do not confirm this result, although the two regions have 
reported significant dummies in the Gini index estimate. These dummies are used as 
instruments in the institutional quality estimation.   
 
16
A sound tax system promotes institutional quality, since it provides the necessary public 
revenue to build good institutions, and it creates a more direct relationship between 
citizens and state. As stated above, it is a crucial variable, as confirmed by our 
estimates, that has not been addressed previously in the literature. Regarding education, 
it impacts positively on institutional quality. This is another important variable that has 
hardly been taken into account. Finally, openness is the only variable that, though 
showing the right sign, is not significant. This result differs partly from other empirical 
research findings. However, the evidence is not entirely conclusive once controlling for 
development.  
 
If education is considered exogenous (table 7, column b), results are very similar, except 
that  this variable and per capita income become significant at 90% instead of 95 %. 
 
 
Table 7. Determinants of institutional quality (II)
 (a)  (b) 
Variable Value  t-ratio  Value  t-ratio 
Constant -2,63  1.70  -2.64  1.76 
Per capita GDP   0.26  2.12  0.27  1.96 
Gini Index  -0.75  2.40  -0.76  2.47 
Taxes 0.73  2.76  0.72  2.83 
Education 0,33  2.03  0,32  1.70 
Openness rate  0.12  1,04  0.12  1,04 
Middle East. & N. Afr.  -0.59  2.49  -0.59  2.49 
Europe & Central Asia   -0.69  4.81  -0.69  4.73 
Adjusted R
2 0,80 0.80 
Nº Observations  78  78 
Infra-identification test:  statistic 
Kleibergen-Paap (χ2 value (6))  14.88 (12.59)  14.00 (12.59) 
Statistic J (χ2 value (5))  10.82 (11.07)  10.89 (11.07) 
Endogenous  Per capita GDP 2004, Gini 
Index, taxes and openness 
rate  
Per capita GDP 2004, Gini 
Index, taxes, education and 
openness rate  





and regional dummies  
Per capita GDP 1990, (Per 
capita GDP 1990)
2, fuel 
exports, education 1990, 
ethnic fragmentation, 
population and  regional 
dummies 
(a) Education is considered as exogenous (b) Education is considered as enogenous 





In sum, empirical evidence suggests that institutional quality is determined by those 
variables more directly related to aforementioned four criteria. They are the criteria that 
define the quality of institutions. By contrast, “historical” origin factors either seem to 
have no effect or their influence is indirectly exerted. Thus, institutional quality seems 
to be uncorrelated with the legal system origin or with the colonial origin
4.  Ethnic 
fragmentation affects institutional quality, but through income distribution, while 
natural resource endowment does it through its negative impact on tax revenue. 
Something similar happens with regional dummies. Middle East and North Africa and 
Europe and Central Asia are the only two regions to show a peculiarity in their 
institutions (negative). This does not mean, however, that there are no other regional 
specificities. They are manifested through the determinants of institutional quality, 
income distribution in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa or low tax collection in 
South Asia. 
 
5.  The impact of institutional quality determinants  
 
It is possible to compute the impact of each institutional quality determinant by using 
the estimates of the previous section. Table 8 shows in the first two columns the real 
and estimated GIs average for different groups of countries classified according to their 
income level. As shown, estimated values are more accurate for high and low income 
countries. The other four columns and first four rows reflect the contribution of each 
explanatory variable to the IGs averages. They are calculated by multiplying the 
estimated parameters by the value of the correspondent variable
5. After adding up the 
constant, the (non-significant) openness rate and regional dummies contributions, these 
values coincide with the estimated indicator. As shown, the contribution of each factor 
decreases as it does income level. This is not the case for the Gini index, since middle-
income countries, particularly lower-middle income countries, show worse results than 
lower income countries.  
 
                                                 
4 The colonial Spanish origin and geographical location were no longer significant if introduced into 
equation (2). In fact, the first of these variables seems to mask Latin American income distribution 
peculiarity, while the second seems to have an impact on per capita income. We also tested if religion, 
another institutional quality determinant proposed in the literature, had any explanatory power. Yet, we 
found no relationship whatsoever. 
5 All calculations have been made by using Table 7 estimates.  
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For all groups, education is the variable that has the lowest impact on institutional 
quality. In rich countries per capita income is the most relevant single factor, while for 
the rest, especially low income countries, is the Gini index. When analyzing the causes 
of institutional quality differences between developed and developing countries, 
interesting results emerge (last three rows of Table 8)
6. In middle income countries, 
taxes are the variable with the largest contribution to this difference, followed by 
income, Gini index, and education. In low income countries, per capita GDP and taxes 
are also by far the most important variables, followed by education and finally income 
distribution. 
 
Table 8. Weight of institutional quality determinants 
     Contribution to GIe 
Income Level  GI  GIe  Pc GDP  Gini  Taxes  Education 
High  1.34  1.34  2.70 -2.61 2.64 0.74 
Upper  Middle  0.17  0.28  2.44 -2.83 2.27 0.67 
Lower  Middle  -0.28  -0.38  2.25 -2.87 2.06 0.57 
Low  -0.65  -0.65  1.98 -2.81 1.94 0.40 
Contribution to differences with respect to high income countries (%) 
Upper Middle    22.05 18.31 31.73  6.21 
Lower Middle    27.66 15.75 36.01 10.47 
Low   36.18 9.69 35.34  17.54 
GI- Governance Indicators average. GIe – Estimated average 
 
Income distribution is the most powerful explanatory variable in all regions if 
performing the same empirical exercise by geographical regions in developing 
countries. It is followed by per capita income in three regions (East Asia and Pacific, 
Latin America & Caribbean and South Asia) and taxes in the other three (table 9). 
Comparing institutional quality differences between rich and developing countries, per 
capita income turns out to be the most influential variable in only one region, Sub-
Saharan Africa, where it is responsible of 36.8% of this difference, followed by taxes 
with 30.3%. The latter is the most important variable in three regions, East Asia and 
Pacific, Latin America & Caribbean and South Asia, explaining 47.3%, 39.7% and 
45.6%, respectively, of the differences with high-income countries. For Europe and 
Central Asia and the Middle East and North Africa, the most relevant variable is their 
institutional particularity, captured by regional dummies. In the first case it explains 
66.9% of that difference, while in the second it represents 35.5%. 
                                                 




Table 9. Weight of institutional quality determinants 
      Contribution to GIe 
Geographic  
Location  GI GIe  Pc 
GDP   Gini Taxes  Education  ECA  MENA
EAP -0.26  -0.37  2.25  -2.86  1.89  0.56     
ECA 0.30  0.30  2.46  -2.60  2.53  0.71  -0.69   
LAC -0.21  -0.21  2.29  -2.96  2.03  0.58     
MENA -0.33  -0.33  2.27  -2.73  2.31  0.55   -0.69 
SA -0.74  -0.68  2.04  -2.68  1.70  0.39     
SAf -0.38  -0.36  2.07  -2.92  2.12  0.49     
Contribution to differences with respect to high income countries (%) 
AOP     28.17  15.45  47.35 11.51     
ECA     23.08  -1.58  11.30  2.94  66.93   
LAC     26.14  22.69  39.72 10.38     
MENA     25.96  6.84  20.37 11.64    35.54 
SA     31.57  3.00  45.63 17.16     
SAf     36.82  18.00  30.37 15.04     
GI- Governance Indicators average. GIe – Estimated average 
EAP (East Asia  & Pacific), ECA (Europe & Central Asia), LAC (Latin America & 




Since the dependent variable is expressed in levels and the independent ones are in logs, 
the estimated parameters are not elasticities. In fact, elasticities are not constant, but 





dIQ β =    (3) 
where Xi stands for variable i and βi represents its corresponding parameter, each 
variable elasticity is 
IQ
i β
. This value decreases as institutional quality rises. According 
to the parameters estimated, the highest elasticity is that of the Gini index for all income 
groups. It ranges from -0.42 in the poorest countries to -0.19 in the richest (Table 10). 
Closely to Gini elasticities are tax revenue elasticities, followed by those of education 
and finally per capita income. 
 
Table 10. Elasticities of  institutional quality determinants (I) 
Income Level  pc GDP  Gini  Taxes  Education 
High 0.070  -0.199  0.192  0.088 
Upper Middle  0.100  -0.285  0.275  0.126 
Lower Middle  0.127  -0.363  0.349  0.160 





The elasticities’ order is not altered by considering different regions: Gini, taxes, 
education and per capita GDP (Table 11). Regarding regions, the largest elasticities 
belong to South Asia and Middle East and North Africa, and the lowest by far to Europe 
and Central Asia. Since these elasticities vary across countries, measures aimed at 
improving institutional quality would have different impacts according to each country 
current institutional quality level. 
 
 
Table 11. Elasticities of  institutional quality determinants (II) 
Geographic Location  pc GDP  Gini I.  Taxes  Education 
East Asia & Pacific  0.128  -0.363  0.350  0.161 
Europe & Central Asia   0.066  -0.187  0.180  0.083 
Latin America & Caribbean  0.093  -0.265  0.255  0.117 
Middle East & North Africa   0.130  -0.371  0.357  0.164 
South  Asia    0.133 -0.379 0.365  0.167 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  0.114 -0.325 0.313  0.143 
 
 
6.  Alternative institutional quality indicators  
 
In order to analyze the robustness of the results found, the same estimation has been 
carried out. We have done it by using as dependent variable the six GIs components and 
four alternative institutional quality indicators. In the first case, taxes are always 
significant, although in one case at 90% probability. Per capita income is significant at 
least at 95% probability in five out of six indicators. The Gini index is significant in 
four of them. Education is only significant at 95% probability in one case and in two 
cases at 90%, but only if it is considered an exogenous variable (Table 12). Openness 
rate is never significant. Middle East and North Africa and Europe and Central Asia 
dummies are significant in four cases, though in two of them at 90% probability for the 
first region. It is important to point out that two specific indicators (Corruption and 
Government Effectiveness) show infra-identification problems at 95% probability, but 




Table 12. Gobernance Indicators Components 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Variable    (a) (b) (a) (b) (b) (a) (b)   
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    -0.31   
(**) 
Adjusted R
2  0,76 0.79 0,77 0.77 0.77 0.38 0,70 0.72 0,67 
Nº  Observations  72 79 88 79 79 120  84 84  100 
Kleibergen-Paap statistic 











































(1) Corruption. (2) Government Effectiveness. (3) Rule of Law. (4) Political Stability. (5) Voice and Accountability. (6) Regulatory Quality. 





(*), significant at 99%, 95% and 90%  probability, respectively 
(c)  4 degrees of freedom (d)  3 degrees of freedom   
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As alternative institutional quality indicators, the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) 
(component Institutions), the Objective Governance Indicators (OGI), the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) and the Doing Business Indicators (DBI) were employed. Both 
per capita income and Gini index are significant in all of them at least at 95%; taxes are 
significant in two (GCI and CPI); education is only significant in DBI, and only at 90% 
probability if it is considered exogenous; openness rate is never significant (Table 13). 
Europe and Central Asia dummy are significant in all estimations, and the Middle East 
and North Africa dummy in two (CPI and DBI). As previously, we did not find any 
other regional specificity. 
 
 
Table 13. Determinants of institutional quality (alternative indicators) 
  GCI OGI CPI  DBI 
Variable       (a)  (b) 













(**)  2.62 
(***)    
Education       -19.02 
(**) -14.43 
(*) 
Openness rate           











2   0,58  0.61  0.66  0.61  0.61 

















J Statistic (v χ










1.55   
(9.49) 
GCI: Global Competitiveness Index 2006 (Institutions). OGI: Objective Governance 
Indicators (2002). CPI: Corruption Perception Index 2006. DBI: Doing Business 
Indicators 2006 (rank) 
(a) Education is considered exogenous (b) Educación is considered endogenous. When education 
is not significant is removed from the estimations  
 (***), 
(**) and 
(*), significant at 99%, 95% & 90% probability, respectively.  
(c)  6 degrees of freedom. 
(d)  5 degrees of freedom. 
 
 
In sum, per capita income, income distribution and tax revenue seem to be robust 
determinants of institutional quality. Education, by contrast, seems a less robust 
variable. Openness does not seem to contribute significantly to institutional quality. In 
addition, Europe and Central Asia and the Middle East and North Africa appear to be 





In this paper, we have singled out the four characteristics that, in our opinion, define 
institutional quality: static efficiency, dynamic efficiency, credibility and predictability. 
Subsequently, we investigated the determinants of institutional quality. The 
determinants under analysis were separated into two groups. One the one hand, those 
variables responding to "historical" features of countries, which are hardly malleable by 
government action such as colonial origin, geographic location, or legal tradition. On 
the other hand, those factors directly related to the aforementioned quality institutional 
characteristics. Our empirical research suggests that the quality of institutions depends 
essentially on development level, income distribution, tax revenue and education. 
Development fosters good institutions, thus creating a virtuous circle between growth 
and institutional quality. In addition, high-quality institutions are expected to develop in 
equitable societies, with a strong fiscal contract an educated population. If these 
conditions are met, then it is possible to build efficient, credible and predictable 
institutions.  
 
On the contrary, "historical" features either they do not seem to determine institutional 
quality or their effects are indirect, through the variables previously mentioned. Thus, 
according to our results, variables such as legal tradition or colonial origin do not have 
any impact on institutions. Variables, as ethnic fragmentation or natural resource 
endowment do, but their impact is indirect; the former by affecting income distribution, 
the latter by decreasing tax revenue.  
 
In sum, our results suggest that the determinants leading to institutional quality are not 
out of the reach of governments. Although it is not an easy task, there is room for 
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Appendix I. Data sources and description of variables 
 
Institutional Quality: 2006 World Bank Governance Indicators average  
 
Per capita Income: constant PPP per capita GDP. 2004 and 1990. Source: World Bank 
 
Gini Index:  Latest year available. Source: World Bank. 
 
Education: Average years of school for the population aged over 25 years. Source: 
Barro and Lee (2000): 
 
Taxes: The main source of homogeneous information on tax revenue is provided by the 
IMF through Government Finance Statistics, which, in turn, is used by the World Bank 
in World Development Indicators. However, both sources face two serious problems. 
On the one hand, the series are incomplete for many developing countries. On the other, 
data usually refer to central governments, which is inaccurate information in highly 
decentralized countries. Therefore, to overcome these problems several sources have 
been used. For Latin America, Gomez Sabaini (2005) has been employed, except for 
Venezuela, whose data corresponds to the World Bank. For the OECD countries, we 
used the data provided by this organization. For the rest of countries, two sources have 
been used. Firstly, the World Bank in countries for which data is available and reliable. 
The WB provides data from income tax excluding social security. Also, it provides 
separately data for the latter. Therefore, it has been proceeded to add them up. The 
University of Michigan World Tax Database is the second source used in countries for 
which the WB has no data (http://www.bus.umich.edu/OTPR/otpr/) or is not reliable. 
Data year is 2000. Yet, in some cases, data was not available for that year, and we 
selected the closest year available, with a maximum difference of three years. 
 
Openness rate: exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP. 2004. Source: World 
Bank  
Ethnic Fragmentation. Source: Alesina et al. (2003) 
 
Population: 2004. Source: World Bank 
 
Fuel: Percentage of fuel exports on total exports. 2004. Source: World Bank  
 
Geographic location: Latitude in absolute value of each country’s capital, divided by 
90. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2007 
 
Legal System: Origin of the legal system, English or French. Source: Reynolds and 
Flores (1989). 
 
Colonial Origin: own elaboration based on Bertocchi and Canova (2002) 